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EPILOGUE: WHEN PRIVACY RIGHTS
ENCOUNTER FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOMS
Terence J. Clark*
THE PHRASE "constitutional right to privacy" is a frequently
used over-generalization for a narrow set of rights that are rec-
ognized by the federal courts in the context of governmental intru-
sion on individual decision making regarding peculiarly personal
matters. In fact, the "zone of privacy" thus recognized by the
courts is the freedom from intrusion by state regulation into those
personal decisions, including marriage, procreation, and child-
rearing. Carving out this niche for peculiarly personal matters
does not mean the courts intended to swallow up an entire body of
tort law into the Constitution.' Much less does it support any no-
tion that the "right to privacy" is one of constitutional proportions
for all purposes.
This symposium has raised issues of whether the right of pri-
vacy was intended to be or has been elevated to the level of a
constitutional right. In this era of increasing news media coverage
of daily events, these issues frequently crystallize in the context of
the exercise of first amendment freedoms. When this clash occurs,
however, the common law derivation of privacy rights becomes ap-
parent: for there is no requirement to balance privacy right factors
against first amendment considerations, as there would be in a
proceeding that involved competing constitutional rights. The fol-
lowing discussion reflects upon the derivation and evolution of the
right to privacy, assesses its development under recognized claims
regarding newsgathering activities, and concludes with some ob-
servations on constitutional limitations to the honoring of individ-
ual privacy rights.
When Warren and Brandeis wrote their historic article on the
* The author is a partner in the Cleveland, Ohio, office of Squire, Sanders & Demp-
sey and Chair of the Media Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association.
I. See Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Conn. 1966).
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right to privacy,2 they focused on the balance between the duty to
refrain from disturbing or invading the private lives of individuals
and the right each individual can legitimately claim to such pri-
vacy.3 The right, in its simplest terms, meant "'the right to be let
alone.' " The authors rejected the notion that this right to privacy
was grounded only in property law, since that basis was viewed
even in the common law of the time as too narrow.5 For similar
reasons, Warren and Brandeis also rejected the right as being
based upon an alleged breach of an implied contract, trust, or con-
fidence.6 After extensive review, including consideration of "natu-
ral rights" as a source, Warren and Brandeis concluded that a
"right of property in its widest sense . . . embracing the right to
an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which
the protection which the individual demands can be rested."' 7 Sig-
nificantly, although they believed "[t]he press . . . overstepp[ed]
in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of de-
cency,"" they reached their conclusion without any reference to
constitutional rights or doctrines as a possible source for the right
of privacy.
During the next seventy years, courts continued to address
privacy issues in terms of natural or common law rights and du-
ties. Then, in 1960, based upon a review of some three hundred
diverse cases in the general arena of invasion of privacy, Dean
Prosser recategorized the conclusions of Warren and Brandeis and
labeled them as a complex of four disparate categories, each of
which was said to represent a separate tort:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
(4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plain-
tiff's name or likenessY
2. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
3. See id. at 197.
4. Id. at 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888)).
5. See id. at 203.
6. See id. at 207, 211.
7. Id. at 211.
8. Id. at 196.
9. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
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Each of the categories provided an opportunity to analyze the
common law (or, if it existed, constitutional) derivation of the pri-
vacy claim in specific case situations. Undoubtedly, Prosser made
a major contribution to the law of torts in placing a framework
around an increasingly amorphous and seemingly boundless body
of law. Like Warren and Brandeis, however, Prosser avoided any
discussion of the constitutional aspects of privacy rights.1"
Subsequent cases demonstrate the limits of the privacy rights
that Warren and Brandeis first brought to the attention of the
legal community and that Prosser then redefined as four separate
torts. Decisional law over the past thirty years serves to under-
score the important corollary to this historical analysis, namely
that the right to privacy is not a constitutional right. It therefore
typically yields to first amendment rights and-except when state
action or regulation is involved-to other constitutional rights
with which it comes into conflict.
Under the first of the recognized "invasion of privacy" torts,
the protection against "intrusion upon seclusion," which Prosser
identified does not fall within any constitutional "zone of pri-
vacy" ' but rather derives from purely common law principles.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts establishes liability for intru-
sion against "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or other-
wise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private af-
fairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person."1 2 A typical example of such a claim in the context of
modern day newsgathering is presented in the case of Boddie v.
10. While not postulating any constitutional derivation for a right of privacy, Prosser
only briefly mentioned the matter of privilege afforded to news media reporting without
referring to conduct in a constitutional context. See id. at 415-16.
11. Justice Douglas, in a burst of creativity, developed the penumbral theory of
"zones of privacy" to apply in certain well-defined contexts of governmental intrusion. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The Supreme Court has reiterated this
theory of "zones of privacy" in subsequent cases, such as Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-
13 (1976) ("While there is no 'right of privacy' found in any specific guarantee of the
Constitution, the Court has recognized that 'zones of privacy' may be created by more
specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power." (cit-
ing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973))). The issue in Griswold was a state statute
banning the sale of contraceptives. Similarly, state imposed restrictions on abortion are the
primary focus of Roe and its progeny. Accordingly, an alleged intrusion does not implicate
a right to privacy of a constitutional magnitude unless the very narrow categories of per-
sonal rights, such as matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and child
rearing, are the focus of the intrusion, and the intrusive activity is carried out by the state.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976).
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American Broadcasting Cos."3 The plaintiff in Boddie claimed
that ABC broadcast, without her consent, an investigative report
exposing judicial corruption that included a hidden camera inter-
view of the plaintiff in her home.1 4 Under the Restatement re-
quirement that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a reasonable
person," the jury determined that the plaintiff's right of privacy
was not violated.' 5
However, the plaintiff in Boddie also attempted to assert an
"intrusion" claim based on the Federal Wiretap Statute and a
claim for damages based on the nonconsensual interception or re-
cording of another's conversations as then proscribed by federal
law.16 After initial remand by the federal appellate court, this
"right of privacy" claim was tested in the district court which
found the statute to be in direct conflict with first amendment
freedoms.' 7 At the time the suit was brought, section 2511(2)(d)
permitted a party to a communication to intercept and record a
conversation without the other party's consent "unless such com-
munication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any crim-
inal or tortious act ...or for the purpose of committing any
other injurious act."' 8 While the case was on remand, Congress
deleted the "injurious purpose" clause, citing Boddie as a prime
example of how that language placed an unconstitutional chill
upon a reporter's exercise of his first amendment rights.' The dis-
trict court granted defendants' motion to dismiss based both upon
that legislative action and its determination that the deleted lan-
guage was unconstitutionally vague.20 The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the decision that the "injurious purpose" language was impermis-
sibly vague and a violation of the reporter's newsgathering
rights. 2' The first amendment rights of the media thus nullified
the plaintiff's attempt to assert a right of privacy in the context of
a federal or constitutional claim to suppress newsgathering
13. 731 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1984), 694 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding for
the defendant on remand from the Sixth Circuit), afid, 881 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 299 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 335.
16. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 812, 814 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(d)(2) (1988)).
17. See Boddie, 694 F. Supp. at 1308.
18. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. at 814.
19. See Boddie, 694 F. Supp. at 1306.
20. See id. at 1308.
21. Boddie, 881 F.2d at 272.
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activities.
The second invasion of privacy branch identified by Pros-
ser-"publication of private facts"-raises perhaps an even more
sensitive area for scrutinizing the possible application of constitu-
tional protections to privacy. Yet it remains clear that the freedom
of the press to publish true facts cannot be overcome by this form
of privacy claim either. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,22 for
example, the Supreme Court held that a state could not prohibit
the publication of the name of a rape victim obtained by the me-
dia from judicial records maintained in conjunction with the pros-
ecution and open for public inspection. The Court recognized that
in "this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of
the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society."'23 However, un-
like its recognition of the first amendment freedoms, the Court
clearly did not raise protection of "private facts" to an interest of
constitutional proportions. Similarly, in subsequent cases where
the Supreme Court has reiterated society's concern over inher-
ently personal and sensitive matters, it has maintained the en-
forcement of constitutional press freedoms over the protection of
those "private facts."24
The remaining two branches of "invasion of privacy" plainly
do not place any limitations upon the exercise of first amendment
freedoms. Indeed, the category of "false light in the public eye"
was simply a name contrived by Prosser for an inherently amor-
phous grouping of decisions that did not fit neatly into the other
"established" branches; and Prosser himself acknowledged that
"false light" had made only "a rather nebulous appearance in a
line of decisions."25 Some courts have rejected the tort of "false
22. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
23. Id. at 491.
24. Even when these issues have been presented in the most sensitive of situations,
such as identification of rape victims in contravention of a state statute, the Court has
upheld press freedoms and left open only the possibility that another case might present a
"weighty" justification for a limitation on such publication of truthful information, which
"may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the
highest order. ... Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); see Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606, 610-11 (1982) (holding a state statute,
which excluded the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of a
minor victim in a sex offense trial, violated the first amendment); Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (holding that a state cannot "punish the truth-
ful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a
newspaper").
25. Prosser, supra note 9, at 398.
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light" altogether because, while it purports to evade first amend-
ment protections applicable in defamation cases, it seeks to pro-
tect reputational (rather than privacy) interests and is merely an
imperfect and less-defined duplication of the long-recognized tort
of defamation. 6 Further underscoring the common law derivation
of "false light," as with the other privacy branches, courts are free
to accept or reject these claims. States such as Ohio have thus
refused to recognize "false light" as a viable theory of recovery.
The absence of a constitutional element to "false light" claims
then becomes particularly evident when a plaintiff seeks to raise
such aL claim to overcome the news media's first amendment
rights.28
The privacy branch labeled "appropriation"-and sometimes
called the "right of publicity"-also has its roots in the common
law rather than the Constitution. Courts alternatively address the
issues relating to the unauthorized use of a name or likeness as
involving a common law "right to be let alone" or some form of
property right in the "commercialization" of one's image. 2' The
"right of privacy" is invaded only when the plaintiff's image or
likeness is appropriated for some commercial advantage; however,
the claim will not lie in the context of the press fulfilling its re-
sponsibility to report to the public matters of newsworthy or legiti-
mate concern regarding, for example, the operations of govern-
ment.30 In other words, the mere use of a plaintiff's name or
image incidental to a news report cannot sustain a claim of "ap-
propriation" for the paramount reason that exercise of the consti-
26. See Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2187 (Mo.
1986) (rejecting "false light" as a permissible action under the facts of that case only);
Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 320-23, 312 S.E.2d 405, 410-
12, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
27. See Yeager v. Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 372, 453
N.E.2d 666, 669-70 (1983).
28. See Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Cos., 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1491
(N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 820 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1987).
29. See Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (misappro-
priation of image or right of publicity not descendible), afd, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976)
(right of privacy not violated by news broadcast of entire act of "human cannonball"),
rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (movie and novel rights to fictitious story based on plaintiff outweighed plaintiff's
publicity rights).
30. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (rape victim's
name is of legitimate public concern and broadcasting it is within the authority of the
press).
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tutional freedoms of the press cannot be so restricted.31
The recent case of Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 3 2
while rejecting an "appropriation" claim, also confirmed that
there is no supposed "constitutional right of privacy" generally in
a newsgathering context. In Brooks, the plaintiff sought to assert
a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, in order to do
so, maintained that the federal rights violated were his "constitu-
tional rights of privacy." 3 This provided the district court with
the opportunity to focus on the well-settled proposition that the
"'right to be free from unwanted publicity. . . is protected, if at
all, by the common law . . . [and this] right to be let alone...
[is] . . . left largely to the law of the individual States.' "I" In
dismissing the civil rights claims, the district court not only up-
held the reporters' newsgathering activities under the first amend-
ment but also recognized that common law rights of privacy are
not incorporated into or guaranteed under the Constitution. 5
The fundamental principle is thus well-established that, ex-
cept in those narrow "zones of privacy" involving not the exercise
of press freedoms but the intrusion of governmental action, indi-
vidual privacy rights are matters of limited state or common law
protection. This brief overview does not afford the opportunity to
analyze the multitude of additional privacy issues that arise in the
many circumstances involving the media's requested access to
public or judicial records or hearings, "locker room rights" in gov-
ernment supported facilities, or attempted limitations upon the ex-
ercise of other newsgathering and reporting activities.3 6 However,
whether those issues involve matters of due process, equal protec-
tion, consideration of alternatives to denial of access, or narrowly
31. See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 737 F. Supp. 431, 435 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 438-41; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
34. Brooks, 737 F. Supp. at 439 (quoting Reilly v. Leonard, 459 F. Supp. 291, 299-
300 (D. Conn. 1978)).
35. See id. at 438-41; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); McNally v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76-77 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976);
Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973);
Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
36. See, e.g., In re National Broadcasting Co., 828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987) (media
requesting access to sealed court records); Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (policy of barring women sports reporters from locker rooms not substantially re-
lated to a sufficient government interest); State ex reL National Broadcasting Co. v. Court
of Common Pleas, 52 Ohio St. 3d 104, 556 N.E. 2d 1120 (1990) (overturning gag order to
allow media access to witnesses).
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tailoring restrictions on access, the freedoms of the press under
the first amendment remain inviolate in the face of any privacy
claims that might be raised in those circumstances. Only when the
state seeks to regulate personal actions or decisions does the "right
of privacy" become elevated to a discussion of constitutional
dimensions. Thus, there are, indeed, limits to the "right of pri-
vacy," and those limits are apparent from an analysis of the right
in juxtaposition to the first amendment and adverse publicity or
newsgathering claims.
In analyzing matters of privacy from the era of Warren and
Brandeis to the present, at times the claimed rights have been
nebulous and the asserted duties unclear; but in the common law
context states remain free to fashion with creativity and to protect
with sensitivity the right of each person "to be let alone." On the
other hand, when states intrude upon recognized, highly personal
"zones of privacy," the Constitution will intervene as a protection
against such state action. As a tribute to our form of government,
however, the press remains unrestricted by any supposed "consti-
tutional right of privacy," which might erode through some form
of balancing or otherwise seek to diminish the well-recognized
freedoms granted under the first amendment.
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